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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Clifford Stewart appeals from his conviction for felony stalking. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedinas 
After he waived his preliminary hearing (R., p. 30), the state charged 
Stewart with felony stalking and misdemeanor violation of  a no-contact order. 
(R., pp. 32-34, 54-55.) The state's probable cause affidavit stated that the victim 
"has been receiving emails at her job in Twin Falls from Clifford Stewart ... in 
violation of an active no contact order ...." (R., pp. 9, 57.) The affidavit also 
stated that Stewart had been previously convicted of stalking the victim and a 
condition of his probation was to have no contact with the victim. (R., p. 58.) 
Stewart filed a motion to dismiss, asserting the information did not allege a 
course of conduct, which he claimed was a necessary element of the crime. (R., 
p. 51.) The district court concluded that the information was not sufficient, but 
allowed the state to amend. (R., pp. 68-73, 92.) The second amended 
information alleged felony stalking as follows: 
That the defendant, CLIFFORD RANDALL STEWART, on or 
between Spring 2006, to the 31St day of December, 2007, in the 
County of Minidoka and the County of Cassia, State of Idaho, did 
feloniously engage in a course of conduct that seriously alarmed, 
annoyed or harassed another person, [G.J.], by sending her 
unsolicited emails, leaving her unsolicited love notes, giving her 
gifts, calling her on the telephone, and by repeatedly displaying 
affection towards [G.J.] by various means and on numerous 
occasions, where the actions constituting the offense are in 
violation of a no contact order; or where the defendant had been 
previously convicted of stalking in the second degree within the last 
seven years; or where the actions constituting this offense are in 
violation of a condition of probation. 
(R., pp. 94-95.) 
Stewart filed another motion to dismiss "upon the grounds and for the 
reason that the State's Affidavit of Probable Cause does not state a course of 
conduct, as is necessary in the Statues [sic]." (R., p. 97.) After a hearing on the 
motion (R., p. 103), the district court denied the motion (R., pp. 104-09). 
Stewart later pled guilty by plea agreement in which he preserved his right 
to appeal from the motion to dismiss. (R., pp. 122-24, 134-36.) The district court 
thereafter entered judgment. (R., pp. 145-48.) Stewart filed a timely appeal from 
the judgment. (R., p. 6.) 
ISSUE 
Stewart states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Stewart's motion 
to dismiss the felony stalking charge? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 8.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Stewart failed to demonstrate on appeal that he proved that the 
current felony stalking charge is barred under principles of double jeopardy by his 
previous misdemeanor stalking conviction? 
ARGUMENT 
Stewart Has Failed To Demonstrate On Appeal That He Proved That The 
Current Felonv Stalkinq Charae Is Barred Under Principles Of Double Jeopardy 
Bv His Previous Misdemeanor Stalkins Conviction 
A. Introduction 
The trial court noted that it "has not been provided with any information 
regarding which of the acts by the Defendant form the basis for" the prior 
misdemeanor conviction, but assumed that the prior stalking conviction "arose 
out of the same course of conduct or acts that form the basis for the instant 
prosecution." (R., p. 106.) The district court framed the issue as "whether, in the 
instant prosecution, the State is permitted [to] use acts of the Defendant that led 
to his prior misdemeanor stalking conviction to prove the element of a 'course of 
conduct' sufficient to satisfy § 18-7905(1)." (R., p. 106.) The court then denied 
Stewart's motion, reasoning that the statute as written applied to Stewart's 
conduct and that Stewart had failed to demonstrate that the prior conviction acted 
as a bar to the current prosecution. (R., pp. 106-09.) Stewart argues that the 
district court erred. (Appellant's brief, pp. 10-20.) Application of the correct legal 
standards to this issue, however, shows that there is no double jeopardy problem 
because the statute is being applied in this case exactly as the legislature 
intended. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether a prosecution complies with the constitutional protection against 
being placed twice in jeopardy is a question of law subject to free review. 
v. Hussain, 143 Idaho 175,176,139 P.3d 777,778 (Ct. App. 2006). 
C. Stewart Presented No Evidence Whatsoever That His Prior Conviction 
Encom~assed The Conduct As Currently Charqed 
The Double Jeopardy Clause applies to prevent multiple prosecutions for 
"the same offence." U.S. Const., Amend. V. The underlying predicate of 
Stewart's double jeopardy argument is his factual claim that this is the "same 
offence" as gave rise to his prior misdemeanor conviction because the current 
felony stalking charge is based, with the exception of one incident of harassment 
of the victim (an e-mail), on the conduct for which he was already convicted. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 10-12.) This factual claim is, however, not supported by 
the record. Because Stewart failed to prove that the conduct underlying his prior 
misdemeanor conviction was also the conduct underlying the current felony 
charge, his double jeopardy claim fails. 
As set forth above, the state charged Stewart with stalking as follows: 
That the defendant, CLIFFORD RANDALL STEWART, on or 
between Spring 2006, to the 31' day of December, 2007, in the 
County of Minidoka and the County of Cassia, State of Idaho, did 
feloniously engage in a course of conduct that seriously alarmed, 
annoyed or harassed another person, [G.J.], by sending her 
unsolicited emails, leaving her unsolicited love notes, giving her 
gifts, calling her on the telephone, and by repeatedly displaying 
affection towards [G.J.] by various means and on numerous 
occasions, where the actions constituting the offense are in 
violation of a no contact order; or where the defendant had been 
previously convicted of stalking in the second degree within the last 
seven years; or where the actions constituting this offense are in 
violation of a condition of probation. 
(R., pp. 94-95.) Of course none of the actual charge itself states that any of the 
course of conduct alleged formed the basis for the prior conviction. 
Stewart extrapolates from the date of the prior conviction, August of 2007, 
that all acts of stalking prior to August of 2007 must have formed the basis for the 
prior conviction. (Appellant's brief, pp. 10-12.) He compares part of the affidavit 
of probable cause that states that Clifford was charged for the misdemeanor for 
conduct between Spring 2006 to July 30, 2007 (Appellant's brief, p. 12 (citing R., 
p. 90)) with the state's supplemental discovery response (Appellant's brief, pp. 
12-13), coupled with a reference to a single e-mail in December of 2007 in the 
affidavit (Appellant's brief, p. 12),' and concludes that because the e-mails listed 
on the supplemental discovery response all occur between January 13,2007 and 
July 28, 2007, that "the evidence that the State was intending to rely on was 
evidence of the same course of conduct for which Mr. Stewart had previously 
been sentenced" (Appellant's brief, p. 13). 
This argument is devoid of merit for many reasons, including, but not 
limited to the following: (1) Stewart may not rely on the evidentiary value of the 
supplemental discovery response because he never asked the district court to 
consider that response as evidence of what conduct formed the basis of the prior 
conviction, State v. Mitchell, 124 Idaho 374, 376 n.1, 859 P.2d 972, 974 n.1 (Ct. 
App. 1993) ("It is axiomatic that an appellate court will not consider new evidence 
that was never before the trial court."); (2) the discovery response is 
supplemental, necessarily meaning that it does not represent the entirety of the 
"evidence the State was intending to rely on" as claimed by Stewart (Appellant's 
' The state notes that because Stewart waived his preliminary hearing the 
probable cause affidavit was entirely gratuitous and that nothing in the record 
actually reflects what evidence the state would have submitted at trial. 
brief, p. 13); (3) even though the e-mails listed in the supplemental response 
were dated within the time-frame of the underlying conviction there is no 
evidence that they were part of or necessary to that conviction; (4) the probable 
cause affidavit clearly states that the victim complained "that she has been 
receiving emails at her job in Twin Falls" and that "these emails are in violation of 
an active no contact order" (R., p. 88 (emphasis added)). That the rest of the 
affidavit focuses on a single e-mail (R., p. 89), does not in any way prove that the 
state had evidence of only a single e-mail, as opposed to the "emaiis" the victim 
stated she had been receiving in violation of the no-contact order. 
In this case Stewart did not present the charging document related to the 
underlying misdemeanor. He did not submit any evidence of what the 
prosecution presented in the trial of that charge. In short, he presented no 
specific evidence whatsoever of what conduct formed the basis of the 
misdemeanor stalking charge. His entire claim was based on assumptions and 
speculation. It was not enough to show that the state's evidence would include 
evidence of his prior conduct; Stewart bore the burden of showing that the state 
in this case was prosecuting him for the same offense for which he had already 
been convicted. United States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378, 385-87 (1992). 
The district court "accept[ed] as true" the claim that "the Minidoka 
conviction arose out of the same course of conduct or acts that form the basis for 
the instant prosecution," but also stated: "The Court has not been provided with 
any information regarding which of the acts by the Defendant form the basis for 
the Minidoka County conviction." (R., p. 106.) Because Stewart failed to present 
any evidence proving his claim that the acts underlying his previous conviction 
would be the same acts supporting the current felony charge, he failed to show 
that double jeopardy was implicated in this case. Where the lower court reaches 
the correct result by relying on an incorrect legal theory, the appellate court will 
affirm the result under the correct legal theory. McKinnev v. State, 133 ldaho 
695, 700, 992 P.2d 144, 149 (1999); State v. Avelar, 929 ldaho 700, 704, 931 
P.2d 1218,1222 (1997); see also State v. Rhoades, 134 ldaho 862,864.11 P.3d 
481, 483 (2000). Because, as noted by the district court, Stewart presented no 
evidence to support his claims, the district court should be affirmed on the basis 
that the record does not show that the factual underpinnings of Stewart's claim 
are correct. 
D. Even Assumina There Was Onlv One Act Of Stalkina That Did Not Form 
The Basis Of The Prior Conviction, Stewart Has Failed To Show The 
Current Char~e Of Stalkinq Was Barred By Double Jeopardy 
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution provides 
that no person shall "be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy 
of life or limb." U.S. Const., Amend. V. This Clause affords a defendant three 
basic protections. It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense 
after acquittal, a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and 
multiple criminal punishments for the same offense. Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 
222, 229 (1994); State v. McKeeth, 136 ldaho 619, 622, 38 P.3d 1275, 1278 (Ct. 
App. 2001). 
In Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773 (1985), the Supreme Court of the 
United States decided a double jeopardy issue very similar to the one before this 
Court. The issue in that case was whether it violated the second and third 
double jeopardy protections stated above (second prosecution after conviction 
and multiple punishments for same offense) to use facts underlying a prior drug 
trafficking conviction to prove a predicate act of a Continuing Criminal Enterprise. 
Id, at 775-77.2 -
As to whether a second prosecution was prohibited because of the prior 
conviction, the Court applied a two-step analysis. Id. at 778-893. The first step 
of the analysis is one of legislative intent: "Where the same conduct violates two 
statutory provisions, the first step in the double jeopardy analysis is to determine 
whether the legislature ... intended that each violation be a separate offense." 
Id. at 778. The second step is to determine whether the prosecution is for the -
"same offence" within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause. & at 786. 
The analysis of these two prongs in Garrett shows that there was no double 
jeopardy bar in this case. 
Review of the statutory provisions shows a legislative intent that a prior 
conviction for misdemeanor (second degree) stalking does not bar a conviction 
for felony (first degree) stalking where the defendant continues to stalk the same 
victim by continuing the same course of stalking conduct after his conviction. 
The interpretation of a statute must begin with the literal words of a statute. State 
v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003). Those words must 
'The state acknowledges that the analysis applicable to this case would likely not 
apply if there had been a prior acquittal, because "the Double Jeopardy Clause 
attaches special weight to judgments of acquittal." Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 
41 (1982). 
be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning and the statute must be 
construed as a whole. Id. Where the language of a statute is plain and 
unambiguous, the court must give effect to the statute as written, without 
engaging in statutory construction. State v. Rhode, 133 ldaho 459, 462, 988 
P.2d 685, 688 (1999); State v. McCoy, 128 ldaho 362, 365, 913 P.2d 578, 581 
(1996). The court assumes that the legislature meant what is clearly stated in 
the statute, unless the result is "palpably absurd." Schwartz, 139 ldaho at 362, 
79 P.3d at 721; w, 133 ldaho at 462,988 P.2d at 688. 
The relevant language of the felony stalking statute provides: "A person 
commits the crime of stalking in the first degree if the person violates section 18- 
7906, ldaho Code, and ... The actions constituting the offense are in violation of 
a ... no contact order ... or ... are in violation of a condition of probation or parole 
...." I.C. 5 18-7905(1) (emphasis added). A violation of section 18-7906, in turn, 
requires a "course of conduct." I.C. 5 18-7906(1), defined as "repeated acts of 
nonconsensual contact involving the victim . .." I.C. § 18-7906(2)(a). Thus, under 
the plain language of this section, a person who "violates section 18-7906 and 
whose actions are in violation of a no-contact order or condition of probation 
commits a felony stalking, without regard for whether some of the stalking course 
of conduct has been subject to a prior charge or conviction. 
Stewart would essentially have this Court read this statute as applying 
only to a person who "violates section 18-7906 [and has not been previously 
convicted for this conduct]" and meets the felony element. He argues that the 
statute requires that the course of conduct be conduct entirely post-dating any 
prior conviction. (Appellant's brief, pp. 10-15.) This argument makes no sense 
under either the plain language or the obvious intent of this statute. It simply 
makes no sense to conclude that this statute makes continued stalking of a 
victim a felony only if the defendant engages in two incidents of harassment after 
imposition of a no-contact order or condition of probation. The legislature here 
intended that conduct like Stewart's, where he continued the same course of 
harassment of the same victim after conviction and entry of a no-contact order 
and condition of probation, to fall within the ambit of the felony s ta t~ te .~  The 
legislature intended this statute to apply exactly as it has been applied in this 
case. 
The second prong of the double jeopardy analysis, whether the charged 
crime is the "same offence" as the prior stalking, is also met in this case. In 
reviewing this prong of the test in Garret the Court distinguished Brown v. Ohio, 
432 U.S. 161 (1977), where the crimes of "joyriding" and theft were the "same 
offence," on the basis that in Brown the "very same conduct" supported both 
charges; "Every moment of [Brown's] conduct was as relevant to the joyriding 
The state also submits that legislative intent that a defendant who continues 
stalking the same victim after his misdemeanor conviction is guilty of a felony for 
the first new stalking incident is shown by the legislative history of this law. 
Although our legislative history is less detailed that that of Congress, the state 
has included with this brief the bill's statement of purpose (Appendix A), and the 
relevant minutes from the hearing of the House Judiciary, Rules and 
Administration Committee for January 27, 2004 (Appendix B), the relevant 
minutes from the hearing of the House Judiciary, Rules and Administration 
Committee for February 17, 2004 (Appendix C), and the relevant minutes and 
exhibit from the hearing of the Senate Judiciary and Rules Committee for March 
3, 2004 (Appendix D). This legislative history shows legislative intent that 
stalking preceding entry of a no-contact order or condition of probation be treated 
as part of the course of conduct. 
charge as it was to the auto theft charge." Garrett, 471 U.S. at 787. In contrast, 
Garrett's prior conviction covered only a few days out of the course of the 
Continuing Criminal Enterprise, and the CCE was not completed until after 
Garrett had already been charged on the trafficking offense. at 788. The 
Court stated: 
Whenever it was during the 5%-year period alleged in the 
indictment that Garrett committed the first of the three predicate 
offenses required to form the basis for a CCE Prosecution, it could 
not then have been said with any certainty that he would 
necessarily go ahead and commit the other violations required to 
render him liable on a CCE charge. 
Id. at 788-89. Likewise, in this case, when Stewart initially stalked this victim it -
could not have been said with any certainty that he would continue that conduct 
after imposition of a condition of probation and a no-contact order. Although 
there is overlap, as in Garrett the state was not charging the same crime for 
purposes of double jeopardy. 
The Court in Garrett then went on to reject an argument either identical to 
Stewart's or so close as to make no difference. The Court stated: "We have 
steadfastly refused to adopt the 'single transaction' view of the Double Jeopardy 
Clause." a at 790. The Court instead referred to Diaz v. United States, 223 
U.S. 442 (1912). where the Court concluded it did not violate the Double 
Jeopardy Clause to prosecute Diaz for murder after his conviction for assault and 
battery where his victim later died of injuries inflicted during that attack. Garrett, 
471 U.S. at 791. Like m, where the state lacked the ability to put the 
defendant in jeopardy for murder before his victim died, Garrett had not 
completed his Continuing Criminal Enterprise before being charged with the 
trafficking offense. Garrett, 471 U.S. at 791. Likewise, the state lacked the 
ability to put Stewart in jeopardy for felony stalking until after his conviction and 
entry of the no-contact order and the condition of probation and Stewart's actions 
in resuming his stalking of the victim. The act of resumption of the same stalking 
course of conduct, which could not have been anticipated at the time of the first 
prosecution, makes this a different offense for purposes of double jeopardy. 
The Garrett Court next determined that the double punishment bar had not 
been violated. The Court stated that the "Double Jeopardy Clause does no more 
than prevent the sentencing court from proscribing greater punishment than the 
legislature intended." Garrett, 471 U.S. at 793 (internal quotes and citations 
omitted). Here the ldaho Legislature certainly intended that a stalker who 
continues his course of conduct after being convicted be punished for the new 
offense. I.C. § 18-7905(4). Disallowing cumulative sentences would here have 
the "anomalous effect" of preventing punishment of defendants who continue 
stalking the same victim after a misdemeanor conviction. See id. at 793-94. 
The analysis and the result in Garrett apply here. The ldaho Legislature 
intended that a stalker convicted of a misdemeanor and ordered to have no more 
contact with that victim would commit a felony if he continued his stalking of that 
victim. The Legislature did not intend that the defendant get one "free" 
harassment of an already stalked victim after entry of a no-contact order or 
condition of probation. This law does not violate the prohibitions against double 
jeopardy because it involves a continuation of the conduct, and is therefore not 
the "same offence" in either law or fact. Nor are there multiple punishments for 
the same crime because the continuation of the course of conduct creates a 
factually and legally new and distinct crime. Thus, even assuming that Stewart 
continued his course of stalking behavior by sending only one e-mail after his 
misdemeanor conviction, double jeopardy does not bar his trial, conviction or 
sentence for felony stalking. 
Stewart argues that where a crime is a single course of conduct the state 
may not arbitrarily charge the defendant with multiple crimes. (Appellant's brief, 
pp. 13-15.) While this is generally true it has no application to the facts of this 
case or the interpretation of I.C. § 18-7905. Stewart relies on Brown v. Ohio, 432 
U.S. 161 (1977), for this proposition. (Appellant's brief, pp. 13-14.) As shown 
above, the Supreme Court of the United States distinguished in Garrett, 
471 US. at 787-88. That analysis applies here. If Stewart's argument is taken to 
its logical extreme, Stewart would be granted immunity against prosecution from 
stalking the same victim by the reasoning he proposes, because at least in 
theory all future stalking would merely be part of the same course of conduct he 
started in 2006. The state is not, as set forth in Garrett, prosecuting Stewart for 
the same course of conduct under double jeopardy. 
Stewart also argues that the felony and misdemeanor stalking are not 
different crimes for purposes of double jeopardy under the standard of 
Blockburaer v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). (Appellant's brief, pp. 16-19.) 
However, "the Blockburger rule is not controlling when the legislative intent is 
clear from the face of the statute or the legislative history." Garrett, 471 U.S. at 
779. It is merely a rule of statutory construction that does not control where there 
is "a clear indication of contrary legislative intent." Albernaz v. United States, 450 
U.S. 333, 340 (1981). As shown above, the Idaho Legislature's intent to bring 
within the ambit of the felony stalking statute those who continue stalking their 
victims after conviction or issuance of a no-contact order or condition of probation 
is clear in the statute; therefore this argument is without merit. 
The prosecution and conviction of Stewart in this case does not implicate 
the Double Jeopardy Clause. As stated by the Supreme Court of the United 
States about the underlying purposes of that clause: 
As we have explained on numerous occasions, the bar to retrial 
following acquittal or conviction ensures that the State does not 
make repeated attempts to convict an individual, thereby exposing 
him to continued embarrassment, anxiety, and expense, while 
increasing the risk of an erroneous conviction or an impermissibly 
enhanced sentence. 
Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 498-99 (1984) (holding that the state was not 
barred from pursuing murder and aggravated robbery charges after defendant's 
guilty pleas to involuntary manslaughter and theft in the same case). See also 
Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31 (1982) (concerns of double jeopardy not implicated 
where appellate wurt grants new trial based on weight of evidence instead of 
sufficiency of evidence); United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978) (double 
jeopardy concerns not implicated where defendant seeks acquittal on grounds 
other than sufficiency of state's evidence); United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463 
(1964) (grant of immunity from punishment too high a price under double 
jeopardy where guilty plea, entered after jury was sworn, was reversed on 
appeal). Where the state has prosecuted and convicted a defendant for part of 
an ongoing course of criminal conduct, these concerns are not necessarily 
implicated when the state subsequently prosecutes for the continued and 
completed course of criminal conduct. Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773 
(1985). Here the state is not seeking to wear down Stewart and obtain a 
conviction or sentence it has been denied. On the contrary, Stewart of his own 
will continued his same course of conduct following his prior conviction, elevating 
his continued course of conduct to a felony in the eyes of the law. Stewart has 
failed to show that prosecuting him for his entire course of conduct violates the 
protections against double jeopardy. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Stewart's conviction for 
felony stalking. 
DATED this 1" day of October 2009, 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this I" day of October 2009 sewed a true 
and correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT'S BRIEF by causing a copy 
addressed to: 
SARAH E. TOMPKINS 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in the State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
APPENDIX A 
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
RS 14049 
his legislation breaks stalking out intd first-degree and 
cond-degree stalking. First-degree stalking is a felony and is 
itted when an individual commits second-degree stalking and 
ast one of the enumerated aggravators. The penalty for 
econd-degree stalking is the same as that already provided in 
FISCAL IMPACT 
e fiscal impact is difficult to determine with certainty as it 
ends upon the increased number of offenders charged with and 
icted of felony stalking. The impact to the general fund 
11 be equal to the cost of imprisoning the additional number of 
fenders, if any, charged, convic;ed and sentenced to prison 
der the revised felony section of this code. 
ame: ~epresentative Debbie Field 
hone: 332-1000 









Chairman Field called on Representative Rydalch. Representative 
Rydalch said this proposed change to the office of the Attorney General 
will provide that a department, agency, office, officers, board, 
commission, institution or other state entity may be represented by or 
obtain its legal advice from either the Attorney General's office or from an 
attorney at law in the private sector. This proposed legislation would 
allow state entities to make a choice on who would represent them. 
Representative Clark said there is a technical problem with this change. 
It would result in a large fiscal impact instead of a revenue neutral impact. 
Representative Pasley-Stuart registered her concern regarding the 
proposed legislation. 
Representative Nielsen moved to introduce RS13623Cl. Roli call vote 
was requested. 
Voting AYE-Representatives Ellsworth, Ridinger, Nieisen, Shirley. Voting 
NAY-Representatives Field, Clark, Sali, Smith, Harwood, Kulczyk, Ring, 
Wills, Boe, Andersen, Pasley-Stuart. MOTION FAILED 4-11-1. 
Chairman Field recognized Heather Reilly to explain the proposed 
legislation. Ms. Reilly said this legislation divides the crime of stalking 
into first-degree and second-degree stalking. First-degree stalking is a 
felony which is committed when an individual commits second-degree 
stalking and one of the aggravating factors is present as enumerated in 
the proposed legislation. Such factors include stalking a victim who is 
under sixteen and the stalking of a victim against whom certain crimes 
have already been committed by the perpetrator. The penalty for second- 
degree stalking is the same as that already provided in Idaho Code. 
Stalking in the first degree is punishable by a fine not exceeding ten 
thousand dollars, or imprisonment in the state prison for not less than one 
year nor more than five years, or by both such fine and imprisonment. 
Definitions are also provided for "family member" and "nonconsensual 
contact." 
Representative Ring moved to introduce RSl3730. Motion carried. 
Chairman Field recognized Olivia Craven to update the members on the 
State of the Commission of Pardons & Parole. Ms. Craven said the 
Legislature saw fit to increase the number of employees of the 
Commission. As a result, the Commission has been able to take on more 
duties and help out the Department of Corrections. Crimes of violence 
always come before the Commission. Parole determination is at the 
complete discretion of the Commission. Parolees must serve one year on 
parole. The Commission does a lot in the area of restitution and it is 
working to make sure inmates are out when they are supposed to be. 
Drug courts are having a very positive effect in helping to keep people out 
of prison. Programs need to continue to be provided and structured 
reentry into the workplace is most important. Inmates receive vocational 
training once they have been tracked in the rehabilitation program. 
Chairman Field thanked Ms. Craven and told the members that the 
Thursday meeting will be the last day to hear personal legislation. The 
Chair said there are four important issues facing the Committee. A task 
force needs to be made up to study each issue. The issues are: estate 
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Kathy Figueredo was recognized. Ms. Figueredo said her daughter was 
murdered. The daughter had been a vital part of the family and of 
Mountain Home. It is essential for victim's families to have a voice. This 
legislation will give our citizens a voice in order to speak for those who 
are murdered. 
Jessica Terry was recognized. Jessica's sister was murdered. She was 
before the Committee to speak on behalf of her sister. This legislation 
would allow victim impact information which is very important in these 
cases. 
Darlene Shaw was recognized. Ms. Shaw said she was here today to ask 
the committee to vote for this bill so that family members will have a voice 
to provide an impact on the trial. Her daughter was a victim at 13 years 
of age. 
After a discussion on the importance of getting the bili into law, 
Representative Wills moved to send H 609 to General Orders with an 
emergency clause added. Motion carried. Representative Wills will 
carry the bill on the floor. 
Representative Wills was recognized. This bill simply says the Supreme 
Court will have the discretion to set the period of time that an 
administrative judge will serve. This will assure a greater depth of 
experience and continuity of leadership in carrying out Supreme Court 
policies and the duties of their office. 
Representative Clark moved to send H 642 to  the floor with a Do Pass 
recommendation. Motion carried. Representative Wills will carry the 
bill on the floor. 
Representative Shirley was recognized. This bill will assist counties in 
recovering some of their cost of providing court generated legal forms 
and written materials, training covering the application and use of these 
documents, and other services provided in connection with court 
assistance offices and coordinated family services. Representative 
Shirley gave each member an Executive Summary (attached.) The fees 
established by the Supreme Court will be reasonably related to and will 
not exceed the actual costs involved in furnishing the forms or providing 
the other services. 
Reprssentative Clark moved to send H 644 to  the floor with a Do Pass 
recommendation. Motion carried. Representative Shirley will carry 
the bili on the floor. 
Heather Reiliy was recognized to explain the legislation. Ms. Reilly said 
she was presenting the bill at the request of Representative Field. This 
legislation repeals Section 18-7905, ldaho Code, relating to stalking, and 
adds a new section 18-7905 to provide for the crime of stalking in the first 
degree and to define terms and set forth punishment. Chapter 79, Title 
18, ldaho Code, is amended by the addition of a new section, 18-7906, 
to provide for stalking in the second degree, to define terms and to set 
forth punishment. Section 19-603 is amended to provide a code 
reference and descriptive language. 
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PRO: 
, . 
Kathy Peterson was recognized to give her testimony. Ms. Peterson.said 
. . 
' !  
she is a victim of stalking. A former fiance threatened her life. He. . . , 
. . conned her out of around forty thousand dollars and carved on his belt .. 
that she would die when she broke up with him. The judges in 
misdemeanor court did not seem to take the matter very seriously. She 
had a civil restraining order which he violated. He also violated a no 
contact order. He has been in and out of mental hospitals. He has also 
i made threats to others. In conclusion Ms. Peterson asked that the law be 
changed by passing this bill. It is necessary to tell the perpetrators that 
. . 
this type of stalking is a serious crime. It needs to be a felony. 
PRO: Heather Reiily was recognized to respond to questions asked by the 
committee. She confirmed that the language on page 2, lines 12 and 13 
would require proof of some kind of intent to use the deadly weapon or 
instrument. a brandishina or some other similar serious act, in order to be 
an aggravating circumstance sufficient to eievate a second'degree 
stalking charge to stalking in the first denree. Ms. Reilly also confirmed 
that the less serious crimes included in Chapters 9, 15and 61 of Title 18 
would not be sufficient to eievate a second degree stalking charge to 
stalking in the first degree. 
MOTION: Representative Saii moved to  send H 668 to  the floor with a Do Pass 
recommendation. Motion carried. Representative Field will carry the 
bill on the floor. 
ADJOURN: Prior to adjourning, Chairman Field said the time has been reached when 
the committee must move along on the bills,. We will fry to hear the 
remainder of the bills in the committee by the endof February. There will 
be a meeting on Friday, February 27, immediately upon adjournment. 
There being no further business to come before the committee, the 
meeting was adjourned at 3:45 p.m. 
Representative Debbie Field 
Chairman 
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March 3, 2004 
Room 437 
Chairman Darrington, Vice Chairman Lodge, Senators Sorensen, 
Richardson, Bunderson, Davis, Sweet, Mariey, Burkett 
Senator Lodge made a motion to accept the minutes of March 1 as 
written, Second was by Senator Richardson and the motion carried by 
a voice vote. 
TO establish a study committee to undertake and complete a study of the 
statutes governing charter schools. This bill will be referred to the. 
Education Committee. 
Provides for definitions of specialty journeymen and apprenfices. This bill 
will be referred to the Commerce Committee. 
Relating to the ldaho Transportation Board, the State Highway Account 
and the ldaho Housing and Finance Assn. to utilize bonds or notes to 
finance projects for transportation infrastructure. This bill will be referred 
to the Transportation Committee. 
Senator Davis made a motion to send RS14217, RS14229 and RS14234 
to print. Second was by Senator Richardson and the motion carried by 
a voice vote. 
Patti Tobias presented this bill for the ldaho Supreme Court, that will 
This bill will increase the annual salary of justices of the supreme court, 
judges of the court of appeals, district judges, and attorney and 
nonattorney magistrate judges by two percent (2%) beginning July 1, 
2004. Presently there are no nonattorney magistrate judges sewing full- 
time in the state of ldaho. However, the annual salary of this category of 
judge must keep pace with salary increments granted to other categories 
of judges in order to adequately compensate retired nonattorney 
magistrate judges who are called in to sewice on a temporary basis under 
Section 1-2221, ldaho Code. The two percent (2%) salary increase for 
justices and judges will cost $279,700.00, which is funded from the 
general fund and was approved by JFAC last week. 
Senator Davis made a motion to send $1407 to the floor with a do pass. 
Second was by Senator Sweet and the motion carried by a voice vote. 
Representative Debbie Field presented this bill that was drafted after a 
call from a woman who was stalked for over 10 years and the statutes in 
ldaho couldn't help her. The law needed to be taken one step further and 
this legislation will do that by breaking stalking out into first-degree and 
second-degree stalking. First-degree stalking is a felony and is committed 
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when an individual commits second-degree stalking and at least one of 
the enumerated aggravators. The penalty for second-degree stalking is 
the same as that already provided in Idaho Code. 
Re~resentative Field told the committee that she had put several of their 
phone numbers into a Google Search and found 2 pages of information 
on them including a map to their homes. She said that it is very easy to 
find a person and the law needs to be tougher for those that do. 
Kathv Peterson, the victim of stalking that called Chairman Field, told the 
committee that she was engaged to a man, who borrowed $40,000 from 
her and when she broke up with him, would not quit harassing her. She 
made police reports, but was told that the City didn't have the money or 
the manpower to do forensics to determine if it was her former fiance. 
She paid for her own forensics and it proved to be Jeff Richland, as she 
thought. The judge suspended any sentence, there was no fine or 
penalty, and she was made to feel like she was pushing a mute issue. 
Jeff married many times, and had threatened ex-girlfriends as recently as 
6 months ago, some of whom are trying to help Ms. Peterson. 
Senator Darrington told Ms. Peterson that the committee was concerned 
that the stalking law put on the books about ten years ago is not 
adequate. 
Heather Reilly, Idaho Prosecuting Association supports the bill. She said 
that they had looked at the bill and given their input. At a recent stalking 
conference there was a concern about the technology for use with Global 
Satellite Positioning systems (GPS), so now the language can include "by 
electronic means". 
Ms. Reillv presented a sheet of stalking facts. (See attached #I) While 
legal definitions of stalking vary from one jurisdiction to another, stalking 
generally refers to a course of conduct that involves a broad range of 
behavior directed at the victim. The conduct can be as varied as the 
stalker's imagination and ability to take actions that harass, frighten 
threaten and/or force himself or herself into the life and consciousness of 
the victim. The report states that 1,006,970 women and 370,990 men are 
stalked annually in the United States, and 77% of female as well as 64% 
of male victims know their stalker. Stalking is a crime under the laws of 
all 50 states, and the District of Columbia and stalking is considered as a 
felony upon the first offense in 14 states. Thirty-four states classify 
stalking as a felony upon the second offense and/ or when the crime 
involves aggravating factors. Aggravating factors may include: 
possession of a deadly weapon; violation of a court order or condition of 
probationlparole; victim under 16; and same victim as prior occasions. 
Senator Burkett asked why there was such an expansive definition of 
family, and especially including roommates. Ms. Reilly said that a lot of 
victims are in college and it is common for stalkers to go to a residence 
and make roommates the subjects of the harassment. The intent of this 
bill is to include people that are in contact with the target to protect them. 
She told the committee that she felt this bili was an imorovement in the 





Senator Burkett made a motion to send to the floor with a do pass. 
Second was by Senator Lodge and the motion carried by a voice vote. 
Senator Burkett and Senator Lodge will co-sponsor this bill on the 
Senate floor. 
Maior Ralph Powell, ldaho State Police presented this bill whose purpose 
is to seek restitution for the analysis of controlled substances for 
conviction on misdemeanor drug offenses as well as felony drug 
offenses. The laboratory incurs the same analysis expense regardless of 
whether the evidence results in a felony or misdemeanor conviction. 
ldaho Code allows restitution to be sought from offenders, upon 
sentencing, for the analysis of felony controlled substances. Restitution 
amounts paid to the ldaho State Police are deposited into the drug 
enforcement donation fund which are used to pay a portion of the cost to 
analyze drug evidence submitted by law enforcement agencies; 
purchase, repair and maintain instruments, equipment and supplies; and 
pay for training and general operationslmaintenance of the laboratory. 
It is estimated that this proposal may generate up to $50,000 annually for 
the ldaho State Police. These funds will be added to the Drug 
Enforcement Donation Account as outlined in the Funds Consolidation 
Act, ldaho Code 57-816. The Joint Finance Appropriation Committee has 
given authority for this. Major Powell said that for $100 analyzed sample, 
they get $16.50. 
Senator Lodge made a motion to send to the floor with a do pass. 
Second was by Senator Sorensen and the motion carried by a voice 
vote. Senator Lodge will carry this bill on the Senate floor. 
Colonel Dan Charboneau, ldaho State Police presented this bill relating to 
the ldaho DNA database Act of 1996. He introduced the director of the 
DNA , Cindy Hill. 
This proposed amendment to the statute provides for the addition of two 
new classes of offenders subject to sample collection: felony burglary and 
felony domestic violence; and provides that persons may be ordered by 
the court to pay restitution to help offset costs incurred by law 
enforcement agencies for the expense of DNA analysis. Burglars are 
known to have a high correlation with rape, and DNA database research 
has proven this. 
A review of the state of Virginia database showed that nearly half of all 
the hits on unsolved rapes come from offenders with prior burglary 
convictions. Domestic assaults likewise are violent crimes often leading to 
rape or homicide. Inclusion of these crime categories in the DNA 
database will increase law enforcement's ability to identify and more 
quickly bring to justice the perpetrators of violent crimes. ldaho is now on 
line with STR (Short Tandem Repeat) DNA analysis and CODlS 
(Combined DNA Index System), and can provide DNA analysis on 
samples submitted for a variety of crimes. DNA analysis is a costly 
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WHAT IS STALKING? 
While legal definitions of stalking vary from one jurisdiction to another, stalking generaliy refers to a course of conduct that involves 
a broad range of behavior directed at the victim.The conduct can be a s  varied a s  the stalker's imagination and ability to take actions 
that harass, frighten, threaten and/or force himself or herself into the l i e  and consciousness of the victim. 
Adapted horn: US Department oflustice. (2001). .REPDDI lo Conprs on Statkin*-eL . 
s 1,006,970 women and 370,990 men are stalked annually in the B Simple obsessional stalkers are the most common m e ,  They have 
United States. some prior relationship with the victim, usually an intimate one. These 
e 1 in 12 women and 1 in 45 men will be stalked in their Metime. cases most often occur in the contert of domestic violence. 
a 77% of female and 64% of male victims know their stalker. li Love obsessional stalkers have had no &sting relationship with the 
8% of stakers are men. 
victim. Many of these stalkers &get celebrities. 
x 59% of female victims and 30% of male victims are staked by an D Erotomanic staken delusionally believe that they are loved by the 
intimate partner. 
victim. ?his is the &st category of stalkers. 
s 81% of women stalked by a  rent or former intimate partner are Individual pmeminrs may not pietirely 6t any single staikci category, and onen 
also physically assaulted by that partner. exhibit characlcrirtia assdated with more than one category: i t  ir jnpoimant to remember that fhese Npoiogier we merely guider. 
931% of women stalked by a current or former intimate partner are Meioy. (1998). '?he Psycholon of W n g :  AP 
also sexually assaulted by that partner. 
m 73% of intimate partner stalkers virbaUy threbtened the victims ~ & ~ & - ~ ~ ~ ~ $ $ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ < @ ~ ~ $ & , ~ ~ -  
with phys id  violence, and almost 46% of victims experienced one 
or more violent incidents by the stalker. 13% of college women were stalked during one six to nine month period. 
= The average duration of stalkingis 1.8 years. r: 80% of campus stalking victims knew thek stalkers. 
n If stalking involves intimate partnen, the average duration of s 3 in 10 college women repdrted being injured emotionally or 
s W g  increases to 2.2 years. psychologicdy from being stalked. 
61% of stdkers made unwanted phone cds;  33% sent or left Fisher. CuUen, and Tune i  (MWI. I h e  Sexual Viehkation of CoUcge Women.' 
unwanted letters or items; 29%vand&ed properly; and 9% kilied NUIBIS. 
or threatened to kiii a family pet . A O F S ~ ~ ~ .  .%'E%Ffj+@:~iFRj~- e 28% of female victims and 10% of male victims obtained a -", . ..~.ux.~ -*. . cb> 
protective order. 69% offemale victims and 81% of male victims s 56% ofwomen stalked took some lype ofseli.protective measure; 
had the protection order violated. often as drastic as reiocating (11%). maden & Thoennes. (1998). 
naden B: Thoenner. (1998). "Stdking in America" NU. 'Stalking in America," NW 
------. s 26% of stalking victims lost time from woik as a result of their -.-.vm, 
~ s ~ ~ ~ & f i ~ & ~ -  
victimization,,md 7Cd never returned to work. Crjaden &Thoennes.) 
e Stalkjng is a crime under the laws of all 50 states, the Disriict of r 30% of female victims and 20% of male victims sought psychological 
Columbia, and the Federal Government 
counseling. maden & Thoennes.) 
r 14 states classify stalking as a felony upon the first offense.' 
c The prevalence of anxiety, insomnia, social dysfunction, and severe 
depression is much higher among staiking victims than the general 
o 34 states classify stalking as a felony upon the second offense and/or popula~on, 8 the stalking involves being foUowed or having 
when the crime involves aggravating facton.' one's properly destioyed. (Blauus e t  al. (2092). 'Toe Toll of S W g ! '  
u Aggravating factors may include: possession of a deadly weapon; viola. 1. Interpenonal Viol.) 
tion of a court order or condition ofprobation/parole; victim under 16: 
same victim as prior occasions. w>".*:,.x?;*>;,...T%6 *.r.-%..S>,.* ,,.. . ~ > ~ ~ . : ~ . * ~ ~ ~ . y , . ~ . > . ~ ~ , % . . , . : . :  ,,>,,v.*"w-.*-" , k . % e & ~ . & ~ 9 ~ w ~ . m b ~ ~ m r ~ & ~ & & ~ m  
For a complete 6st of state, mbai and Feded lawrvirit wununma%/rrc ' y  76% of femicide victims had been staked. 
' Last updated Much 2W3 
E 67% had been physically abused by their intimah partner. 
,>'? : ..?i" ".. *l.? <'xp ~ <'. -~~~~,~.~,:~.~~7-y<7-Y7-Y&7-Y7-~-7-Y7-Y----- r 89% oifemicide victims who had been physically abused had also 3 . ~ ~ ~ , s ~ L ~ ~ . ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ d ~ . ~ ? l f f ~ . ~ ~ ~ , ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ .  been stalked in the 12 months before the murder. 
nte SlolhLrg Resource Ce,iter is a Program oftlie National Centerfor Viciims 79% abused femicide victims reported stalking during the same o/Cn'me. Our duo1 mission is to raise naliotial oworenm ofslalking o~rd to period that they abuse, 
e,lcouroge lhe deoofopment and implementation o/mullidirciplinary r@onses 
ro r~aihing in loin! conrmvnilies across the rovntij iVe con provide you with: " anempled lemicide cases at least One  WiSode Of stalking within 12 months prior to the attempted femicide. 
e Training 
:, 54% of iemicide victims reported stalking to poiice before they 
c Technicai Assistance were Mled by their stalkers. 
r Protocol Development 
'?he murder of a woman 
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